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Abstract—Synchrophasor technology is used for real-time con-
trol and monitoring in modern power systems. IEEE C37.118
communication framework is most widely used by synchrophasor
devices such as Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) and Phasor
Data Concentrators (PDCs). The size, format and structure of
IEEE C37.118 payloads vary significantly from one PMU/PDC
to the other which make traditional signature based IDS tools
(i.e., SNORT, Suricata, etc) inefficient for synchrophasor-based
systems. Thus, this paper presents the design of a comprehensive
model-based Synchrophasor Specific Intrusion Detection System
(SS-IDS) and analyzes its features and capabilities. The proposed
SS-IDS is implemented as a light-weight efficient multi-threaded
tool using optimized PCAP filters. The defined model-based rules
enable it to detect known as well as unknown attacks (including
unintentional misuse). The functionalities of the proposed SS-IDS
are validated in the lab using a testbed consisting of real PMU
data and NRL CORE based emulated network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Synchrophasor technology became an integral part of mod-
ern power systems with applications ranging from simple grid
dynamics monitoring/visualization to emerging real-time pro-
tection and control applications. It enables operators to track
power system dynamics in real time and take prompt actions
whenever necessary. Since the introduction of IEEE C37.118
communication framework in 2005, it has been widely used
in most synchrophasor devices such as Phasor Measurement
Units (PMUs) and Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) [1]. In
2011, IEEE C37.118 split into two parts separating phasor
measurement and communication requirements. It consists of
4 types of messages: (i) data (contains actual synchrophasor
measurements), (ii) configuration (contains PMU/PDC config-
urations), (ii) command (contains instructions for data source
i.e., PMU) and header (contains human readable informa-
tion about filters, scaling, algorithms etc). The configuration
message has further three types: CFG-1 contains PMU/PDC
capabilities, CFG-2 contains information necessary to decode
data messages, and CFG-3 contains most of same data as
CFG-2 but with added flexibility, signal and PMU location
information.
Depending on the PMU type (commanded or spontaneous),
IEEE C37.1118 communication semantics could be differ-
ent. Fig. 1 depicts basic communication scenario for PMU
operating in commanded mode. PMU in spontaneous mode
cannot receive commands and continuously transmits data to
destination without stopping.
A. Related Work
Synchrophasor technology has numerous real-time moni-
toring, protection and control applications [2]–[4]. Most ap-
plications are still in lab testing and validation [5], [6]. At
present, IEEE C37.118 is most well-known synchrophasor
communication framework. Authors in [7], [8] addressed its
evolution and key characteristics.
IEEE C37.118 is highly vulnerable to cyber attacks. Authors
in [7], [9]–[11] highlighted vulnerabilities in IEEE C37.118.
Authors in [12], [13] investigated how vulnerabilities of IEEE
C37.118 can be exploited in the form of different attacks.
Several researchers have investigated specific attacks e.g., data
integrity attacks [14], packet drop attacks [15], DoS attacks
[16], GPS spoofing attacks [17], etc.
Two research articles have addressed Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) for synchrophasors [18], [19]. Authors in [18]
used single threaded SNORT IDS tool for testing 11 proposed
rules. While authors in [19] used ITACA IDS tool for detecting
network scanning, PING based Denial of Servie (DoS) and
Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks altering line frequency.
B. Paper Motivation and Contributions
Both, SNORT IDS [18] and ITACA IDS [19] lack com-
prehensive rules sets and have limitations including: (i) the
size, format and structure of IEEE C37.118 packets vary from
one PMU/PDC to other leaving traditional signature based
tools [18], [19] unsuitable for synchrophasor devices under
different configurations, (ii) SNORT and ITACA tools require
expert technical knowledge of IEEE C37.118 to tailor/use it
for a specific PMU/PDC, (iii) certain types of attacks could
not be detected (or hard to detect) with signature based tools
[18], [19] e.g., packet injection attacks, packet drop attacks,
GPS spoofing attacks, detecting delayed, out-dated or replayed
packets, unknown attacks etc, (iv) to reduce false positive
and false negative detections, multiple IDS instances need
to be deployed in network and on synchrophasor devices
which communicate with a management server (i.e., corre-
lating between events from multiple IDS instances), and (v)
SNORT and ITACA tools are unsuitable and a specifically
implemented IDS system for synchrophasors is needed with
access to security credentials if packets are encrypted (e.g.,
IEC recommended GDOI security mechanism for synchropha-
sors).
These limitations and requirements motivate the need for
a new comprehensive Synchrophasor Specific IDS (SS-IDS)
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Figure 1. IEEE C37.118 communication scenario for PMU in command
mode.
system. Thus, this paper presents the design of SS-IDS fol-
lowing NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)
recommended architectural design. The SS-IDS implements a
comprehensive set of model-based rules necessary to detect
ARP spoofing attacks, port and network scanning attacks,
GPS spoofing/blocking attacks, packet injection attacks, packet
drop attacks, delayed packets or replay attacks, communication
jamming and DoS attacks, data integrity attacks, physical
attacks on PMUs/PDCs, command injection and other form
of MITM attacks. The SS-IDS is implemented as an efficient,
highly flexible and light-weight multi-threaded tool using
optimized PCAP filters. It provides user friendly interface for
registering rules without requiring technical knowledge about
IEEE C37.118 packets. The SS-IDS can work simultaneously
for many PMUs/PDCs under different configurations and also
keeps their events and state information isolated. The proposed
system also uses management server that correlates events
from multiple SS-IDS instances to reduce false positives (i.e.,
benign activity/information detected as malicious) and false
negatives (i.e., SS-IDS failed to detect malicious activity/infor-
mation). This paper also validates functionalities of proposed
SS-IDS in lab testbed consisting of real PMU and NRL CORE
based emulated network.
II. PROPOSED SS-IDS: DESIGN AND FEATURES
The proposed SS-IDS system is depicted in Fig. 2. All SS-
IDS components can be part of organization’s network or can
be connected through a separate network known as manage-
ment network (i.e., detection components have two network
interfaces). The management network has strict security mea-
sures and is normally kept isolated from main organization’s
network. Management network has additional equipment cost
but conceals the SS-IDS from attackers. It ensures adequate
bandwidth for SS-IDS to work under adverse conditions (i.e.,
synchrophasors have usually very high transmission rates).
A. Architectural Components
The proposed SS-IDS system consists of four components:
1) Sensors and Agents: It can be observed in Fig. 2 that
proposed SS-IDS performs both network-based detection as
well as host-based detection. SS-IDS monitoring and ana-
lyzing component is known as sensor for network based
detection. While a host-based detection component is known
as agent. Sensors are normally deployed on gateway devices
and monitor network traffic of entire network (or a segment
of network) for suspicious activity. Whereas, agents monitor
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Figure 2. Proposed SS-IDS system for synchrophasor applications.
network traffic of one specific device (e.g., PMU or PDC)
and monitor activities occurring within that device. Current
SS-IDS implementations provide flexibility to operate it as a
sensor or as an agent.
2) Management Server: It is a centralized server that
manages received information from sensors and agents and
performs correlation. It offers many benefits including detec-
tion of activities that an individual agent/sensor cannot detect
(e.g., MITM attacker injects a genuine command or attacker
modifications seem genuine to agent/sensor). Normally for an
IDS, it is impossible to eliminate false positives and false
negatives completely. Usually, reducing false positive alarms
increases false negatives and vice versa. The choice of many
organizations is to reduce false negatives at the cost of increase
in false positives. The management server is also beneficial
to reduce both, false positives as well as false negatives by
performing correlation of information received from multiple
agents and sensors.
3) Database Server: It is the repository of events from
sensors, agents and management servers.
4) Console: It is the interface for users to access and
configure SS-IDS components.
B. Operational Modes
The proposed SS-IDS can operate in two modes:
1) Inline Mode: In this mode, sensors are deployed in
network at specific locations where the whole network traffic
passes through it. Firewall and gateway devices are the most
suitable locations for inline sensor deployment. The benefit
of inline mode is to easily stop/drop malicious packets if
necessary.
2) Passive Mode: In this mode, no traffic directly passes
through sensors. Sensors are usually deployed at more secure
locations and monitor the copy of actual network traffic. The
network traffic can be accessed using network taps or load
balancers which distribute copies of network traffic to multiple
sensors.
C. Model-based Rules
The proposed SS-IDS provides model-based rules to char-
acterize acceptable synchrophasor system behavior and detect
violations from defined models. Due to limited applications
and protocols in power systems, model-based detection is the
most favorable choice for synchrophasor based systems in
order to detect unknown attacks as well. The SS-IDS raises
Table I
SELECTED SIGNATURE BASED RULES FROM PROPOSED SS-IDS.
Parameter Msg Type Field Significance
Network Settings All N/A Detecting ARP spoofing and port scanning attacks.
(MAC, IP, Port)
Protocol Version All SYNC Verifying protocol version (2005 or 2011 version).
Device ID All IDCODE Verifying device identification code.
Clock Failure All FRACSEC PMU clock fault or failure detection (time not reliable).
Data Error Data STAT Detecting if PMU data is erroneous.
Time Sync. Data STAT Detecting if PMU is not sync with UTC time source.
Phasor Values Data PHASORS Detecting dummy value (0x8000) i.e., PMU data
absent in PDC packet.
Station Name CFG 1-3 STN Verifying station (PMU/PDC) name.
Line Frequency CFG 1-3 FNOM Verifying nominal line frequency (50 Hz or 60 Hz).
PMU Latitude CFG 3 PMU LAT Verifying PMU latitude in WGS84 datum.
PMU Longitude CFG 3 PMU LON Verifying PMU longitude in WGS84 datum.
PMU Elevation CFG 3 PMU ELEV Verifying PMU elevation in WGS84 datum.
Command Type Command CMD Detecting malicious command given to the PMU.
alerts whenever violations from defined models are detected.
The model-based rules are carefully defined for IEEE C37.118
to reduce or eliminate false alarms. In proposed SS-IDS,
model-based rules are sub-categorized into four types:
1) Signature-Based Rules (SBRs): A signature is a pattern
that SS-IDS looks for in received IEEE C37.118 packets.
The SS-IDS raises an alert when a malicious signature is
detected or genuine signature is violated. The SBRs cannot
track or understand complex states of applications or protocols
(e.g., analysis of a packet based on information in previously
exchanged packets). The SBRs are very effective to detect
known attacks but ineffective to detect unknown attacks or
variants of known attacks.
In the proposed SS-IDS, a total of 41 SBRs have been
defined for IEEE C37.118. Due to space limitation, Table I
lists selected rules of significant importance. The network pa-
rameters inside packets (e.g., source and destination MAC and
IP addresses and transport port numbers) are very helpful in
detecting ARP spoofing (i.e., normally the first step of MITM
attacks), network and port scanning attacks. The SBRs are
also useful in detecting GPS spoofing/blocking attacks (e.g.,
clock failure) on PMUs/PDCs, command injection attacks and
different form of MITM attacks.
2) Range-Based Rules (RBRs): The RBRs define accept-
able upper and lower bounds for different IEEE C37.118
parameters. The SS-IDS raises an alert when a parameter
value outside acceptable defined range is detected. The RBRs
are effective to detect violations from defined models but
ineffective to detect attacks that do not violate range models
(e.g., an attacker intelligently fakes a parameter value so that
it still lies within acceptable range).
In the proposed SS-IDS, a total of 9 RBRs have been defined
for IEEE C37.118 as reported in Table II. The RBRs are
suitable to detect GPS spoofing/blocking attacks and different
forms of MITM attacks manipulating the parameters values.
3) Threshold-Based Rules (TBRs): The TBRs set limits
for normal and abnormal behaviors. The threshold represents
maximum acceptable variation as a percentage of a parameter
value. The SS-IDS raises an alert when a parameter value
exceeds the threshold. Similarly to RBRs, TBRs are effective
to detect violations from defined models but ineffective to
detect attacks that do not violate threshold.
In the proposed SS-IDS, a total of 6 TBRs have been defined
for IEEE C37.118 (last 6 rules in Table II). The TBRs can
Table II
RANGE BASED RULES FROM PROPOSED SS-IDS.
Parameter Msg Type Field Description
Time Quality All FRACSEC Acceptance range of time error from UTC source.
Measurement Time Data STAT Time uncertainty range in PMU measurement.
Unlock Time Data STAT Number of seconds to reacquire time synchronization.
Phasor Values Data PHASORS Acceptable range for phasor values.
Analog Values Data ANALOG Acceptable range for analog values.
Freq. Deviation Data FREQ Acceptable range of frequency deviation from nominal.
ROCOF Data DFREQ Acceptable range for rate of change of frequency.
Time Window CFG-3 WINDOW Phasor measurement window length in microsecond.
Group Delay CFG-3 GRP DLY Phasor measurement group delay in microsecond.
Note: Last 6 rules in IDS can also be set as threshold based rules.
Note: Some parameter depend on many fields e.g., calculated Phasor Values also needs
PHNMR, PHUNIT, FORMAT etc. For simplicity, most relevant field is shown in table.
Table III
SELECTED STATEFUL BEHAVIOR BASED RULES FROM PROPOSED
SS-IDS.
Parameter Msg Type Field Behavior
Protocol Semantics All SYNC Detecting unnecessary messages to/from PMU/PDC.
Time-stamp All SOC Detecting delayed, outdated or replayed packets.
Leap Second All FRACSEC Should be set no more than 60 sec nor less than
Pending Bit 1 sec before a leap second occurs.
Leap Second All FRACSEC Should be set in first message after leap second
Occurred Bit and remains set for 24 hours.
Leap Second All FRACSEC Should be 0 (add) or 1(delete) same time or before
Direction Bit leap second pending bit and stay same for 24 hours.
Message Size Data FRAMESIZE Message sizes matches information received in CFG-2.
Data Error Data STAT Detecting if PMU data error persists for prolonged time.
Time Sync. Data STAT Detecting if out of sync persists for prolonged time.
PMU Trigger Data STAT Should be set for at-least 1 data message and 1 min.
Config. Change Data STAT Should be set for 1 min before configuration change.
Phasor Values Data PHASORS Detecting unexpected variation in phasor values.
Config. Count CFG 1-3 CFGCNT Incremented each time configuration changes.
Data Rate CFG 1-3 DATA RATE Detecting packet drop or injecting attacks.
Command Command CMD Detecting unusual/unexpected command given to PMU.
Note: Some parameter depend on many fields e.g., Time-stamp also depends on
FRACSEC and TIME BASE. For simplicity, most relevant field is shown in table.
be applied to same parameters as RBRs. However, current
SS-IDS implementations are flexible enough and allow user
to decide what type of rules to activate/deactivate based on
system requirements. The TBRs are normally suitable to detect
different forms of MITM attacks manipulating the parameters
values.
4) Stateful Behavior-Based Rules (SBBRs): The SBBRs
differentiate benign protocol activity from malicious activity
by analyzing acceptable state models for deviations in each re-
ceived packet. Unlike other rule types, SBBRs understand and
keep track of network/protocol behavior by storing necessary
state information in previously exchanged packets. SBBRs are
useful to detect more advanced attacks especially those which
involve a series of packet exchanges. They are particularly
useful for IEEE C37.118 to detect unexpected sequences of
packets (data, configuration, command etc) from PMU, PDC
and/or control center applications. SBBRs can detect if the
same command is issued repeatedly, unexpectedly or out
of sequence based on IEEE C37.118 semantics (depending
on PMU type: commanded or spontaneous). The primary
drawback of SBBRs is that they have high computational
complexity and resource intensive.
In the proposed SS-IDS, a total of 32 SBBRs have been
defined for IEEE C37.118. Due to space limitation, Table
III lists selected rules of significant importance. The SBBRs
are useful to detect GPS spoofing/blocking attacks, packet
injection attacks, packet drop attacks, delayed packets or
replay attacks, communication jamming and DoS attacks, data
integrity attacks, physical attacks on PMUs/PDCs, command
injection and other form of MITM attacks as well as uninten-
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Figure 3. Architectural design of agent/sensor in proposed SS-IDS.
tional misuse.
III. IMPLEMENTATIONS
The implementation of the proposed SS-IDS encompasses
three software entities: (i) sensor/agent, (ii) management server
and (iii) database server. The functionalities of the manage-
ment server (i.e., events management and correlation) and
database server (storing events information with time-stamp)
are comparatively straight forward. Due to space limitation,
this paper addresses implementations of only the sensor/agent.
The agent/sensor software is implemented in Linux OS us-
ing standard C/C++ programming language (along with Boost
and PCAP libraries). It is implemented as a single software
that acts as either agent or sensor in passive or inline mode
based on user specified settings in a configuration database.
Further configurations can be specified for monitoring and
management interfaces (also works if no separate management
network is used). The software enables a user to add more than
one PMU or PDC, and works simultaneously for all of them
while keeping their events and state information isolated.
The basic agent/sensor software architecture is depicted
in Fig. 3. It includes PCAP filters, IEEE C37.118 decoder,
analyzer/detector, set of rules, state manager, events manager
and console. A number of BPF driver optimized PCAP filters
are activated in promiscuous mode based on registered active
rules by user. Each rule can be in active or inactive state and
corresponds to one of the model-based rule types addressed
in Section II-C. Sniffed packets are provided to the IEEE
C37.118 decoder which extracts all embedded information
(from packets headers and payloads) using parsers of data,
configuration, command and header messages. The extracted
information along with the raw packet is provided to the ana-
lyzer/detector that detects malicious information/activity based
on registered and active rules. During analysis, the analyzer
communicates with the state manager to retrieve previous
communication states or store new state information. The
analyzer provides detected event (if any) information along
with the raw packet to the event manager. The event manager
communicates event information to management server as
well as database server over UDP sockets. The console in
current implementations is both local command line as well as
network based (only accessible within management network).
The event manager at present is command line based and
displays events information in the following format:
<TIMESTAMP> <SENSOR AGENT ID> <SEVERITY> <DEVICENAME>
<DEVICETYPE> <ALERT TYPE> <ALERT COUNT> <SRC MAC>
OpenPMU Monitoring Application
NRL CORE
Emulated Network
Management Server
Sensor Sensor
Agent
IEEE C37.118
IEEE C37.118
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Attacker
Figure 4. Experimental testbed for validation of SS-IDS features.
<DST MAC> <SRC IP> <DST IP> <SRC PORT> <DST PORT>
<EVENT DESCRIPTION> <ACTION TAKEN>
Current implementations have four SEVERITY levels: ultra,
high, medium and low. DEVICENAME indicates PMU name,
DEVICETYPE indicates PMU or PDC, ALERT TYPE cor-
responds to rule name, and ALERT COUNT is number of
detections. ACTION TAKEN is NULL and is for future use
when prevention capabilities will also be implemented.
IV. TEST-BED AND EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section addresses functional evaluation of the im-
plemented SS-IDS in practical networking environment. The
testbed for functional evaluation is depicted in Fig. 4. It
consists of a real PMU (i.e., OpenPMU [1]), monitoring ap-
plication (i.e., simply visualize synchrophasor measurements),
two sensors for network based monitoring, two agents for host-
based monitoring (i.e, one for PMU and one for monitoring
application), a management server, an attacker PC (used to
simulate attacks) and NRL CORE based emulated network.
The management server receives events from sensors and
agents and performs correlation. Multiple detection instances
(i.e., sensors and agents) and correlation of events by manage-
ment server help detect some malicious activities which could
not be detected by a single sensor/agent alone e.g., packet
or command injection attacks. Further, it also reduces false
positives and false negatives.
NRL CORE is an open source and highly customizable
emulated network tool that provides real-time connections to
real-devices or real-networks. It runs applications and proto-
cols without modifying them. The NRL CORE in Fig. 4 was
configured on Ubuntu 14.04 using single router configuration
which interconnects two different subnets. Each subnet has
been mapped to a VLAN interface on a VLAN capable
Netgear switch. The two sensors in Fig. 4 are connected to
each VLAN interface.
The testbed in Fig. 4 was used to successfully validate the
following SS-IDS functionalities:
• To detect GPS spoofing/blocking attacks, simulated data
messages were injected with clock failure information set
in the messages.
• For MITM attacks, simulated packets were injected with
phasor values violating specified range based rule.
• For replay attacks, simulated data messages were injected
with old GPS time-stamps.
• The importance of management server was analyzed in
reducing false positives and false negatives. To this aim,
a simulated command message requesting configurations
was injected from an attacker PC to the PMU. It was
a valid command but since the PMU’s agent detects
it but other sensors and agent could not detect it, the
management server declares it suspicious.
• Synchrophasor applications normally have very high data
transmission rate (normally 50+ packets per second)
and packet drop attacks might not be tolerated. Further,
synchrophasor measurements are time-stamped with GPS
time and they must be received within a few milliseconds
to be declared as valid. In the testbed, NRL CORE was
used to demonstrate two attacks and detect them with SS-
IDS: (i) packet drop attacks (which is analogous to intro-
ducing certain percentage of packet loss in NRL CORE)
and (ii) packet delaying attacks (which is analogous to
introducing certain link latency in NRL CORE).
V. CONCLUSIONS
IEEE C37.118 is highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and
several attack cases have been demonstrated in literature. Due
to involvement of synchrophasor-based systems in critical in-
frastructures, a SS-IDS is utmost necessary for early detection
of malicious activity.
Previous related works [18], [19] lack comprehensive rules
sets and face limitations such as expert IEEE C37.118 techni-
cal knowledge required to write rule, signature based rules
written for one PMU/PDC cannot work other PMU/PDC
of different configurations, lack to detect certain types of
attacks (packet drop and injection, GPS spoofing etc) and lack
management server and distributed deployment of agents and
sensors.
This paper presented the design, implementation and valida-
tion of a very comprehensive and light-weight multi-threaded
SS-IDS tool using optimized PCAP filters. Unlike previous
works [18], [19] which uses general IDS tools for a single
point/device, this paper implemented a SS-IDS from scratch
following NIST recommendations and considered security of
the entire system. Its comprehensive sets of model-based
rules enable it to detect known as well as unknown attacks
(including unintentional misuse). Further, the SS-IDS provides
user friendly interface for registering rules and is flexible
enough to simultaneously analyze traffic of more than one
PMU/PDC while keeping their events and state information
isolated. Unlike point-to-point connections [19], this paper
validated the effectiveness of SS-IDS using emulated network
with characteristics similar to the realistic network.
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